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1 .  Did Everything Begin in 1979?
The years 1979 and 1980 were a pivotal moment for the world and for Japanese con-
servatism alike. This paper focuses on the policy-making group of Masayoshi Ōhira, 
who was the prime minister of Japan during this transition.
　　1979 saw the birth of the Thatcher administration in Britain, along with the full-
fledged implementation of liberalization measures by Deng Xiaoping in China; these 
formed an important transition leading toward the subsequent trend of an increasingly 
rapid spread of market values. The Iranian revolution occurred in Iran at the same 
time, while the Afghan resistance movement against the Soviet invasion gathered 
pace. Hence, this was also the year that marked the start of the current Islamic re-
vival. Looking back, one can say that 1979 was the year that gave us advance notice 
of the dawn of the age of market values and religion.
　　In addition to these four events, journalist Christian Caryl, in his book Strange 
Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century, covers the visit of Pope John Paul II to 
his native Poland in the same year （Caryl 2013）. In the sense that this event was the 
first step toward the dissolution of the socialist system in Poland, 1979 should also be 
remembered as the “beginning of the end” for the socialist system as a whole.
　　If one considers the twentieth century as beginning with the Russian Revolution 
of 1917 and ending with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, this was definitely a cen-
tury spent in the company of “socialism as an alternative.” In this sense, looking back 
to 1979, a point ten years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, one can say that “socialism 
as an alternative” was already in the process of being lost. The events of 1979 demon-
strate that people were instead looking to the market―or, alternatively, to religion―
as driving forces for the advancement of society.
　　Against this background of world events, where, one might ask, does Japan fit in? 
In retrospect, it seems truly ironic, but 1979 is also memorable as the year that saw 
the publication of Ezra Vogel’s Japan as Number One. It was precisely in this year, 
when the world was searching for a new direction, that this “Japan-worshipping” book 
appeared. 
　　In fact, it is certain that Vogel did not write the book with the intention of being 
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a Japan worshipper. The question was how America should handle the economic 
progress of Japan. The book, which was written as a re-examination of American soci-
ety, was received in Japan as an unadulterated piece of Japan worship. While it may 
not be the case that Japan as Number One instigated the trend, a distinctive tendency 
toward self-affirmation became highly apparent in Japanese political and social dis-
course thereafter.
　　It may well be that 1979 was the fateful year in which Japanese society, rather 
than opting for either market values or religion, chose for itself to continue with the 
status quo. Bearing this awareness in mind, this paper traces the fate of a policy-mak-
ing group founded in 1979. Looking back at the legacy of this policy-making group, 
positive and negative, this paper examines the choices Japanese society made at the 
time. 
2 .  Prime Minister Ōhira’s Policy-making Group
In Japan in 1979, the administration of Masayoshi Ōhira had been in power since the 
end of the previous year. As a politician, Ōhira continued in the mainstream of Japa-
nese conservatism as it had been since the time of Shigeru Yoshida; simultaneously, 
however, he was mentally searching for an image of the future of Japan after the pe-
riod of high economic growth. In his opening address on January 25, he stressed the 
transition from the modern to the postmodern, along with a shift in emphasis from the 
economic to the cultural, as critical issues for Japanese society.
　　Ōhira meant what he said. He immediately formed a policy-making group （known 
in Japan as a “study group”）, the “Ōhira Policy Study Group,” composed of nine sub-
groups. Under Ōhira’s own initiative, the group investigated research topics such as 
garden cities, the Pacific Rim Solidarity, and the shift of emphasis from economics to 
culture. The chairmen of the sub-groups, such as Tadao Umesao, Tadao Uchida, and 
Saburō Ōkita, were appointed by Ōhira （Nagatomi 2000）. Ōhira himself was appar-
ently extremely keen on the group’s work and enthusiastically participated in its re-
search, paying close attention to the opinions of junior and middle-ranking academics 
and bureaucrats in attendance.
　　The study group failed to produce almost any results in political terms because of 
Ōhira’s sudden demise in 1980. Ōhira received merely three policy papers from them 
during his lifetime; other papers were hurriedly compiled after his death. Although 
some of the group’s themes were later taken up by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Naka-
sone, important differences in approach emerged in the meantime, as will be discussed 
later. Ōhira’s initiatives, it must be concluded, ultimately misfired.
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　　However, the work of this policy-making group was certainly not meaningless. 
First, the group was established with an awareness of the radical changes that faced 
postwar Japanese society, which had in a sense achieved completion and which had 
weathered the oil crisis of the 1970s. It cannot be said that the majority of the issues 
that the policy-making group tackled were adequately dealt with subsequently. The 
debates undertaken by the policy-making group were to have a major influence on 
subsequent political and social discourse in Japan over numerous issues, including the 
reform of the centralization of administrative power, the development of regional com-
munities, the pursuit of a less materialist lifestyle and less materialist values, the de-
velopment of a new middle class, the approach to be taken toward the advent of an 
information-based society, and international policy with regard to the Pacific Rim.
　　In particular, while academics and critics such as Ken’ichi Kōyama, Seizaburō 
Satō, Shunpei Kumon, and Masakazu Yamazaki, as well as Yasusuke Murakami who 
had strong personal connections, although he was not directly involved with the 
group, were actively involved in popularizing the debate on these issues in mass-circu-
lation magazines such as Chūō Kōron. As an example of the concerns of the time, one 
could indicate Murakami, Satō, and Kumon’s “Bunmei toshite no ie shakai ［The society 
of ‘household’ as a civilization］,” Murakami’s “Shin chūkan taishū no jidai ［The age of 
the new middle mass］,” and Yamazaki’s “Yawarakai kojinshugi no tanjō ［The birth of 
a soft individualism］.”
　　If hitherto the debate in Japan had been led by “Iwanami intellectuals” such as 
Masao Maruyama, who understood the state of Japanese society as the remaining ves-
tiges of a feudal society, the stage was now set for the age of the “Chūō Kōronists.”
3 .  The Background to the Policy-making Group
So, let us ask, why did Ōhira decide to organize such a large-scale policy-making 
group, composed of 130 academics and intellectuals and 89 members of the bureau-
cracy? One reason that could be given is the heightening sense of crisis that was felt 
within Japanese conservatism at the time.
　　One salient point here is the essay “Japan’s Suicide,” published in the literary 
magazine Bungei Shunjū in 1974. The essay was published under the Orwellian 
pseudonym “Group 84,” but it is now clear that “Group 84” consisted of Ken’ichi 
Kōyama, Seizaburō Satō, and Shunpei Kumon. At the time, these three were young 
academics in their thirties and early forties. They had met Ōhira through Jirō Ushio, 
the president of the electronics firm Ushio, Inc. These three, while inducted into the 
policy-making group by Ōhira, were to play a central role in its proceedings.
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　　The salient feature of the essay “Japan’s Suicide” is its sense of crisis. The essay, 
picturing contemporary Japanese society in terms of the downfall of the Roman Em-
pire, warned that the collapse of the Roman Empire was not due to attacks by barbar-
ian tribes from beyond the frontier but due to a “forfeit of the ability for 
self-determination” brought about by “spiritual disassociation” and “social collapse.” 
The essay warned that the same phenomena were apparent in contemporary Japa-
nese society. Their diagnosis was that Japanese society, enervated by the exigencies 
of the period of high economic growth, faced the prospect of psychological and spiri-
tual dissolution.
　　Another background factor behind this diagnosis was the structural changes tak-
ing place in Japanese society. In 1963, Hirohide Ishida, the Liberal Democratic Party 
（LDP） politician and advisor to Tanzan Ishibashi, published the essay “Hoshu seitō no 
bijon ［The vision of a conservative political party］.” In this essay, Ishida predicted 
that the population drift from rural villages to the city would adversely impact the po-
litical fortunes of the LDP, which had a rural support base. The evident message was 
that the LDP, as a conservative party, faced extinction under the prevailing circum-
stances. The essay helped spark an internal revolution within the LDP aimed at the 
modernization of the party. 
　　How did Ōhira handle this state of affairs? While several policies such as the ra-
tionalization of party organization, the eradication of internal party factions, and the 
introduction of a single-seat constituency system were seriously argued, his thinking 
was not entirely in tune with the reformist movement within the LDP （Nakakita 
2014）. His overriding concerns were the limits of modernization and the catch-up 
model of economic development as the central axis. Timely enough, the publication of 
the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth came in 1972. Stressing the limits to the planet’s 
resources, this paper’s warnings of a tragic future of overpopulation and environmen-
tal collapse had a major impact. Since the late 1960s, Ōhira had already been claiming 
that the accepted model of modernization through economic development in imitation 
of the advanced economies had reached its limits; he now began in earnest to think 
through the “next stage” of modernization with economic growth at its core. The oil 
shock of 1973 did all the more to demonstrate the legitimacy of his concerns. 
　　Ōhira increasingly formulated his own position as “proceeding beyond moderniza-
tion into an age with its emphasis on culture.” It is certain that what lay behind this 
approach was Ōhira’s feeling of opposition to Takeo Fukuda, his rival for the post of 
prime minister. In Ōhira’s eyes, Fukuda’s noted hawkishness in foreign policy and en-
thusiasm for military preparedness and amending the Constitution seemed to point to-
ward a route “back to the pre-modern era.” （It is certain that Fukuda’s approach 
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takes its contemporary form in the cabinet of Shinzō Abe.） Standing against this pol-
icy, Ōhira argued for the continuation of the lightly-armed/economics-driven model in-
herited from Shigeru Yoshida. Indeed, he aimed to shift the emphasis of this model 
from economic to cultural concerns and, in doing so, to seize the commanding heights 
of Japanese conservatism. Rather than an opposition of cities and farming villages, 
Ōhira sought a blending of the two; he was zealous about the devolution of powers to 
the regions. This approach would later factor into his thinking on garden cities; at the 
same time, he was conscious of the distinction between his own thinking and that of 
his rival Fukuda, who placed more emphasis on the role of central government. 
4 .  The Double Character of the Ōhira Policy-making Group
These policy papers had a double character. On the one hand, there was the recogni-
tion that Japan’s modernization had reached a certain turning point, a reappraisal of 
the Japanese lifestyle in favor of a new approach to society and organizations that 
transcended the concerns of economic development. 
　　Looking back from today, one might well say that Ōhira’s grasp of the issues at 
stake was indeed valid. This is because 1979/80 was undoubtedly the turning point 
where Japan changed into a mature society and began facing a future of declining 
birthrates and an aging population.  
　　For example, in 1980, Yasuo Tanaka―then a student―published his novel Nan︲
tonaku, Crystal Feeling and became an instant celebrity. This work gained wide atten-
tion for its coverage of youth culture and lifestyles; it is also famous for its vast 
amount of author’s notes. The majority of them explain and critique brand names that 
appear in the text; however, it is deeply interesting that the very final note in the 
book is a prediction hinting at the advent of declining birthrates and an aging popula-
tion. The note quotes a special report on trends in birthrates prepared by a govern-
mental committee on the population problem, along with a 1979 report （released as a 
white paper in 1980） by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. 
　　In this sense, we can say that the trend toward declining birthrates and an aging 
population, which has continued until today, was already forecast in 1980 （even in a 
best-seller novel!）. Additionally, as the subject matter of this novel spells out quite 
clearly, the cause of declining birthrates and an aging population centers on how the 
genders relate to each other. Also apparent in the novel is a clear awareness of the 
impact of changing value systems and lifestyles. However, given that the work was 
read, at least at the time, as a novel of manners, it is also clear that awareness of 
these problems had by no means become general or mainstream.
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　　In this context, it merits our attention that, among the policy-making sub-groups 
established by Ōhira, one was devoted to strengthening the family unit. In fact, the 
participants in this sub-group included gender scholars, such as Hiroko Hara, and de-
bated topics such as new approaches to work for men and women. In the work of this 
meeting, it is not impossible to discern the beginnings of one of the currents leading to 
changes like the employment gender equality legislation of 1986. 
　　However, that said, the main problem also lies here. As clarified by a glance at 
the material produced by this sub-group, the family model depicted at the center of 
the deliberations is basically that of a husband working in an industry and a wife who 
stays home as a full-time homemaker. It must be said that the model is completely 
that of the male breadwinner. The other sub-groups displayed a strikingly positive 
view of the Japanese-style management model and Japanese-model system of industry, 
also discoursing eloquently, it should be clear, on the traditional family model, which 
even today exerts a powerful sway, and on the traditional model of working life. 
　　On this basis, one may clearly observe the differences between two papers pro-
duced with the same group of intellectuals at the core of the discussions: “Japan’s Sui-
cide” （1974） and the 1980 policy papers of the Ōhira Prime Ministerial policy-making 
group. While “Japan’s Suicide” is brimming with a sense of crisis toward Japanese so-
ciety, what stands out about the 1980 policy papers is their air of self-satisfaction and 
commitment to the status quo. It is certain that what lies between these two dates is 
the performance of the Japanese economy, which recovered from the oil crisis at a 
relatively early stage.  
　　Regarding what came to be known as “Japanese-style management,” the 1982 
OECD Report on Labor in Japan had already touched on the themes of “lifetime em-
ployment,” “seniority by length of service,” and “in-house unions,” which constitute so-
called “Three Sacred Treasures” of the system overall. It is not impossible that this 
kind of overseas reassessment of Japan―as we have already mentioned, Ezra Vogel’s 
Japan as Number One was published in 1979―working in conjunction with the typi-
cally Japanese way it was received in-country, gave birth to the Ōhira policy papers, 
as the “ideology of 1980.” Therefore, having weathered the oil crisis and now facing 
the birth of the bubble economy, Japanese society confirmed its self-affirmation and 
commitment to the status quo. Additionally, we see here the reason Japan’s socio- 
industrial way of life, along with its concomitant apportioning of gender roles to men 
and women, became “mythologized.” 
　　In that sense, although Ōhira’s policy-makers set out on their deliberations with 
an exceptionally keen and accurate awareness of the structural changes taking place 
in Japanese society and the issues stemming from such, one might characterize their 
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end as a mechanism for the creation of a powerful ideology arguing in favor of con-
tinuing the status quo. In selecting these policy-makers, Ōhira had urged his cohorts 
to “choose a crowd of people who are going to have a big impact in the twenty-first 
century.” This indeed proved the case. The group as it was put together included 
many of the bureaucrats and intellectuals who were to dominate Japan thereafter. 
（Indeed, the group included Haruhiko Kuroda, currently the president of the Bank of 
Japan.） In terms of individuals involved in the group as well, the paradigm of this 
group continues to have a decisive impact on subsequent Japanese society.
5 .  The Legacy of the Ōhira Policy-making Group
Finally, let us examine the legacy of this policy-making group. As we have already 
seen, the policy-making group came to a close with the sudden demise of Ōhira. Zenkō 
Suzuki, who succeeded Ōhira as prime minister, showed no interest in the group, and 
in this sense, the group’s recommendations failed to achieve any political impact. 
　　The only exception is Yasuhiro Nakasone, who became prime minister after that. 
Nakasone did pay attention to the group’s recommendations; Kōyama, Satō, and 
Kumon in particular became his advisors, thus becoming the driving force behind the 
Second Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform and the proposal of admin-
istrative reforms. However, some commentators indicate the existence of clear differ-
ences between Ōhira’s and Nakasone’s terms of office. For example, the political 
scholar Hideo Ōtake argues that the administrative reforms undertaken by the Naka-
sone administration were driven by economists and industrialists such as Hiroshi Katō 
and Yōichi Sando and that these reforms were predicated on an ideology of economic 
liberalism. However, Ōhira’s advisors included more intellectuals involved with cul-
tural affairs; Ōtake argues that this was a group different in tone, with its own distinc-
tive set of values not based on the principle of market competition （Ōtake 1994）. 
Others, however, like Kōji Nakakita emphasize rather the similarities between the two 
groups, with emphasis on rejecting big government and on individual responsibility, 
along with cooperation in families, workplaces and the community （Nakakita 2014）.
　　Regarding this issue, this paper adopts the stance that while both groups rejected 
big government, the logic behind doing so was very different for the Ōhira and Naka-
sone groups. The point is that while Ōhira opposed nationalism and emphasized the 
importance of medium-sized groups such as the local community and the smaller busi-
ness firms, the Nakasone group intended to forward a neoliberal reform program 
through means of privatization. Ideologically, the two groups were completely differ-
ent. In this sense, it is difficult to claim that the legacy of Ōhira’s policy-making group 
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had any direct connection with the Nakasone reform program.
　　Rather, if one were to posit a legacy bequeathed by Ōhira to Nakasone, one might 
search along the lines of conservatism of a new age. As stated previously, Japanese 
conservatism had trod a difficult path since the 1960s because of the structural 
changes taking place in Japanese society; this being the case, we see that the LDP has 
rapidly restored its strength since Ōhira’s death in 1980. The LDP won a crushing vic-
tory in the Diet elections of 1980, which we could term “Ōhira’s condolence.” They 
went on to do the same in the Diet elections of 1986 under Nakasone. This was the 
juncture at which Nakasone stressed, “We’ve won the left wing over.” With everyday 
life for the majority of people now more stable, Japanese conservatism won and main-
tained the support of a city-dwelling population that had been conservatized, propel-
ling it into a new era. In this sense, one perhaps could say that Nakasone harvested 
where Ōhira had sown. 
　　In this way, through Nakasone, the Ōhira policy-makers’ legacy lived on, in a dou-
ble character. Hence, a more optimistic sense of self-affirmation that policy papers rep-
resent kept inflating, partially due to the development of the bubble economy. This is 
one aspect of affairs. However, it is not as though a more positive aspect has failed to 
leave behind any impact on Japanese politics through the 1990s and beyond.
　　In 1992, Morihiro Hosokawa, who had just resigned as the governor of Kumamoto 
Prefecture, declared his formation of the Liberal Social Alliance （Jiyū shakai rengō） in 
the literary magazine Bungei Shunjū. Hosokawa’s idea eventually found expression as 
the Japan New Party, which went on from 1993 to press administrative reforms and 
to form a coalition administration under Hosokawa. The person who drafted Hosoka-
wa’s declaration was Ken’ichi Kōyama （Nakakita 2014）. The text of the declaration in-
cludes the following passage, in which the sense of crisis evident in “Japan’s Suicide” is 
somewhat evident: “The greatest danger that Japan directly faces is that Japanese 
politics has failed to carry out the obligations which it has imposed on itself. Even if 
Japanese politics grasps the fundamental nature of this historic time of transition and 
produces a basic policy line to deal with this time of transition, the turmoil will con-
tinue unless we can forge a new national consensus aiming to change the policies of 
Japan” （Hosokawa 1992: 95）. Additionally, the declaration’s emphasis on decentraliza-
tion of power continues Ōhira’s line of thinking on the issue. 
　　Furthermore, after the fall of the Hosokawa coalition, the LDP coalition with 
Tomiichi Murayama’s Japanese Socialist Party （JSP） came under the influence of Kōi-
chi Katō, a political successor to Ōhira. Opinions are divided on the Murayama admin-
istration, but at least the war apology Murayama gave, conscious of Japan’s wars of 
aggression and colonialism, could only have been achieved through this coalition of 
231
1979-80 as a Pivotal Moment in Japanese Postwar Conservatism
References
Carly, Christian （2013）, Strange Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century, Basic Civitas 
Books.
［All titles below are translated from the original Japanese.］
Group 84 （2012）, Japan’s Suicide, Bunshunshinsho.
Hosokawa Morihiro （1992）, “Declaration of the Formation of the Liberal Social Alliance （Jiyū 
shakai rengō）,” Bungei Shunjū, June.
Murakami Yasusuke, Satō Seizaburō and Kumon Shunpei （1979）, The Society of “Household” 
as a Civilization, Chūō Kōron Sha.
Murakami Yasusuke （1984）, The Age of the New Middle Class: An Anatomy of Postwar 
Japanese Society, Chūōkōronsha.
Nagatomi Yūichirō （2000）, “The Meaning of the Ōhira Policy-making Group,” Ōhira Memorial 
Foundation, ed., Kyokashūjitsu 去華就實 ; Available on the foundation’s webpage.
Nakakita Kōji （2014）, The Change in LDP Politics, NHK Books.
Otake Hideo （1994）, The Age of Liberal Reform, Chūōkōronsha.
Yamazaki Masakazu （1984）, The Birth of a Soft Individualism, Chūōkōronsha.
Uno Shigeki （2014）, “Dull Bull/Philosopher Prime Minister and the Intellectuals: On Prime 
Minister Ōhira’s Policy-making Group,” Asteion, No. 81, pp.172―183.
LDP and JSP. Certainly, within these limits, the mid-1990s were a kind of “conserva-
tive-liberal age.” One might call this the time when the final spark of Ōhira and his 
policy-making group’s legacy was visible. 
　　If this is indeed the case, Ōhira’s policy-making group’s efforts were definitely 
meaningful, in that they drew a line between Japanese conservatism and its tendency 
toward nationalism, instead formulating another kind of conservatism that looked 
rather at the continual development of Japanese civil society. This trend showed a 
splendor of its own during the 1990s, before being completely silenced in the new mil-
lennium. However, the trend is not one that should be discarded completely, including 
the possibility of a “conservative liberalism” in Japan. 
　　In this age of a trend toward market values and religion, it is clear that Japanese 
conservatism has made its own special choice. When we examine the issues through 
present-day eyes, it becomes clear that the choice has been for the continuation of Ja-
pan’s own social status quo. Yet even so, the intellectual tendencies evident in the age 
of Ōhira also firmly grasped the seeds of dissent toward such a status quo. On this 
basis, the assessments of Japanese society offered by the Ōhira group of policy-makers 
may in a sense constitute a critical evaluation of the subsequent “two lost decades.” 
At the same time, it may be found that they offer the key to transcending them.
